Scyber Schata


"From bits to information"

Defence Systems, Policies and Risks

Outline

- Data, Information, Knowledge and Wisdom.
- Information Security and Forensic Computing.
- Impact and Harm.
- Risks, Costs and Benefits.
- Kill Chain Models.
- Defence Mechanisms.
- Defence-in-Depth.






OCYDER Cata


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Security, Incident Response and Forensic Computing



Investigation


- Investigating an intrusion on a system (incident response). This might lead to a criminal prosecution, but most of the time the intrusion is investigated in order to be able to detect it in the future, and to thwart the activities at an early stage.
- Investigation of a criminal activity (forensic computing). This might lead to a criminal prosecution, or to thwart the activities in the future.
- Investigation of a breach of security policy. This might lead to a disciplinary procedure within an organisation.



Due Care and Due Diligence

With due care, the organisation must make sure that it has taken the correct steps in the creation and implementation of its security policy and in its risk analysis.

• Then due diligence relates to the actual operation and maintenance of its security system, especially around vulnerability testing. Thus a company might take due care in analysing and designing their security policy, but not take due diligence in actually proving that it works. It can work the other way, in that a policy might be implemented with due diligence, but the originally creation of the policy has not been properly analysed/designed. It is thus important, in terms of any future liability, that security systems are designed, analysed, implemented and maintained with both due care and due diligence.



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Impact and Harm

Impact and Harm



Physical or Digital harm. Economic harm. Psychological harm. Reputational harm. Social and Societal harm.



Scyber Schata


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Risks, Costs and Benefits


Risks, Costs and Benefits


 $ALE = AV \times ARO$

ALE – Annual Loss Expectancy. AV – Asset Value **Low Likelihood, High Cost High Likelihood, High Cost** - Probably not worth mitigating - Maybe worth mitigating against. against **Highly Likely, Low Cost** Low Likelihood, Low Cost - Maybe worth mitigating against. - Worth mitigating against High Low likelihood likelihood





Risks, Costs and Benefits







CORAS Ontology





CORAS Risk Management





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Kill Chain Model

Incident Taxonomy

A Threat:


- Hacker.
- Spies
- Terrorists.
- Corporate Raiders.
- Professional Criminals.
- Vandals.
- Military Forces.

is achieved with Attack Tools:

- User command.
- Script or program.
- Autonomous Agent.
- Toolkit
- Distributed Tool.
- Data Tap.

for Vulnerabilities:

- Implementation vulnerability.
- Design vulnerability.
- Configuration vulnerability.



for Objectives:

- Challenge/Status.
- Political Gain.
- Financial Gain.
- Damage.
- Destruction of an Enemy.


which Results in:

- Corruption of Information.
- Disclosure of Information.
- Theft of Service.
- Denial-of-Service.


with Access for:

- Files.
- Data in transit.
- Objects in Transit.
- Invocations in Transit.

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan



Kill Chain Model





Unified Kill Chain Phases



Initial Foothold:Compromised System

Pivoting

Network Propagation: Internal Network

Access

Action on Objectives: Critical Asset Access

- Reconnaissance
- Weaponization
- Delivery
- Social Engineering
- Exploitation
- Persistence
- Defense Evasion
- Command & Control

- Discovery
- Privilege Escalation
- Execution
- Credential Access
- Lateral Movement

- Collection
- Exfiltration
- Target Manipulation
- Objectives

Unified Kill Chain Model

#	Unified Kill Chain	Cyber Kill Chain® (CKC)	Laliberte	Nachreiner	Bryant	Malone	MITRE ATT&CK™	UKC after literature study	UKC after Red Team C1	UKC after Red Team C2	UKC after Red Team C3	UKC after Red Team KC	UKC after APT28 C4 & KC
1	Reconnaissance	1	1	1	1	1		1	1	1	1	1	1
2	Weaponization	2	3	3	3	2		2	2	2	2	2	2
3	Delivery	3	5	5	6	3		7	7	3	3	3	3
4	Social Engineering	5	6	6	11	5		3	3	4	4	4	4
5	Exploitation	6	8	8	14	6		5	4	5	5	5	5
6	Persistence	8	14	9	18	8	6	6	5	6	6	6	6
7	Defense Evasion	18	18	14	16	10	11	8	6	7	7	7	7
8	Command & Control			18		5	7	9	8	8	8	8	8
9	Pivoting					11	13	11	9	9	9	9	9
10	Discovery					14	10	10	11	11	11	10	10
11	Privilege Escalation					17	14	14	10	10	10	11	11
12	Execution					18	12	12	14	14	14	12	12
13	Credential Access						15	13	12	12	12	13	13
14	Lateral Movement						16	17	13	13	13	14	14
15	Collection						8	15	17	17	17	17	15
16	Exfiltration							16	15	15	15	15	16
17	Target Manipulation								16	16	16	16	17
18	Objectives												18




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Defence Mechanisms

Types of intelligence


- **Deter**. This is where the system is designed and implemented in order to initially deter intruders from attacking the system in the first place.
- Log. This is a key element in modern systems which requires some form of logging system. It is important that the data that is logged does not breach any civil liberties, and is in a form which can be used to enhance the future security of the system.
- **Detect**. This is where detection agents are placed within the network to detect intrusions, and has methods of tracing the events that occurred in an intrusion, so that it can be used either in a forensic computing investigation, and/or to overcome a future intrusion. Organisations often have many reasons for detecting network traffic.
- Protect. This is where policies are created which protect systems, users and data against attack, and in reducing this potential damage. A key element of this is to protect them against accidental damage, as accidental damage is often more prevalent than non-accidental damage.
- React. This is where a policy is defined which reacts to intrusions, and defines ways to overcome them in the future. Often organisations do not have formal policies for this type of activity, and often rely on ad-hoc arrangements, where the method of reacting to a security breach is created after the event.
- Recover. This is where policies are defined to overcome any system damage, whether it is actual physical damage, the abuse of users; or the damage to data.
- Audit/verify. It is important that the security policy allows for auditing and for the verification that it achieves its requirements.



Types of intelligence


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Types of intelligence








OCYDER Cata


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Defence in Depth

















Forth-level

defence












Second-level defence








First-level defence





Forth-level defence








Third-level

defence




Second-level

defence








First-level defence




Threats








Layered Model





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Defence Systems, Policies and Risks